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RECENT CASES
Army and Navy-Selective Service-Necessity of Oath of Alle-
giance for Induction-Habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner passed
physical examination and was accepted by the army but refused to take
oath of allegiance.' Upon disobeying an order to be fingerprinted military
charges were preferred, and he was sent to the guard house. Petitioner
contends he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, that he was not inducted
into army, and therefore is not subject to military jurisdiction. Petition
refused in lower courts.2 Held, judgment reversed (two justices dissent-
ing)," a selectee is not inducted into the army until he subscribes to the
oath of allegiance. Billings v. Truesdell, 64 Sup. Ct. 737, 88 L. Ed. 573
(March 27, 1944).
In World War I a selectee was subject to military jurisdiction'from
the date his notice of call required him to report,4 and a failure to take the
oath of allegiance was considered immaterial.5 However, under the present
Selective Service Act military jurisdiction does n6t begin until a man has
been "actually inducted"; 6 and since the Act itself does not state what
constitutes induction, the problem presented by the instant case was to
determine when that induction occurs. In defining induction the first set
of selective service regulations merely said that when selectees were found
acceptable they should be read the oath of allegiance, after which they
i. During his physical examination the petitioner made it clear to the officers in
charge that he did not intend to serve in the army. At the induction office he also
stated he would not serve and asked to be allowed to turn himself over to the civil
authorities. He was then told he was already under military jurisdiction and was
placed under guard to prevent his leaving. However, permission was granted to use
a telephone, and in this means he retained an attorney to file this petition. When the
officer ordered him to rise and take the oath of allegiance he refused to do so; and
when, after the oath was read to him he was asked whether he subscribed thereto, he
replied, "I do not. I refuse to take this oath." Whereupon he was told his refusal
made no difference, that he was in the army.
2. 135 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. ioth, I943), as/frming, 46 F. Supp. 663 (D. C. Kan.
I942).
3. Justices Roberts and Frankfurter.
4. Article 2 of the Articles of War, 39 STAT. 65i (i916), now io U. S. C. A.
§ 1473, in defining persons subject to military law includes ". . . all other persons
lawfuily called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service,
from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the
same." This provision of the second Article of War was first enacted into law in i9i6
and would still apply except for the modification imposed by the 194o Selective Service
Act, note 6 infra.
5. Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (C C. A. 8th, i918). For a more complete
discussion of military jurisdiction over selectees during World War I see Note (1943)
91 U. OF PA. L. REV. 751.
6. "No person shall be tried by any military or naval court martial in any case
arising under this Act unless such person has been actually inducted for the training
prescribed under this Act or unless he is subject to trial by court martial under laws
in force prior to the enactment of this Act." 54 STAT. 894 (940), 50 U. S. C. A. 3I
(Supp. i943). Since Art II of the Articles of War conferred military jurisdiction
over selectees and was already in force prior to the Act, the Army contended there
was jurisdiction under the "unless" clause for such offenses as were non-criminal un-
der the Act. However, the Supreme Court regarded this as too narrow an interpreta-
tion of the Act, stating that the intent of Congress was to deny all jurisdiction until
induction had taken place; instant case, at 741, 575-576.
(447)
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would be informed that they were members of the armed forces.7 Under
that regulation there was a dictum by an Oregon district court to the effect
that the oath was necessary for induction.8 However, the regulations were
subsequently amended and the definition in force at the time of the instant
case read simply that "selected men found acceptable will be inducted". 9
The defense contended that since the Act itself merely provided that a
selectee should not be inducted until he was found acceptable, 10 induction
occurred automatically at the moment of acceptance and should not be post-
poned beyond that time," that the oath of allegiance which followed was a
mere formality to solemnify the occasion.' 2 However, the Supreme Court
rejected this argument and interpreted the selective service regulation to
mean that induction was to be a separate step following army acceptance,
pointing out that such a construction was consistent with other regulations
providing for stays of induction while the selectee was appealing or contest-
ing his classification.' 3 Moreover, the Court decided that induction was
not complete upon reading the oath to a selectee who did not subscribe to
it.'1 It reasoned that the order to report for induction impliedly included
an order to submit to induction, 5 that if the selectee did not subscribe to
the oath he was violating that order and subject to the penalties of the
civil law, not the military. The Court was strengthened in both of these
interpretations by subsequent selective service regulations. These provide
for pre-induction physical examinations and army acceptance to be followed
later by induction orders,' 6 and which expressly state a duty on the part
of the selectee to submit to induction.'7  Perhaps the most important result
of the instant case will be to enable a selectee to contest his classification
in the courts before he is taken into the army, instead of having to enter
7. IV SELECrIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS § 429.
8. Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. Ore. i94O).
9 SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1941) § 633.9.
io. "Provided further, That no man shall be inducted for training and service un-
der this Act unless and until he is acceptable to the land or naval forces for such train-
ing and service and his physical and mental fitness for such training and service has
been satisfactorily determined." 54 STAT. 885 (1941), 5o U. S. C. A. § 303 (Supp.
1943).
ii. United States v. Smith, 47 F. Supp. 607 (D. C. Mass. 1942). This was also
the belief of the district court in the instant case, Ex Parte Billings, 46 F. Supp. 663
(D. C. Kan. 1942). At the time of the instant case war department regulations stated
that if an individual refused to take the oath, he would not be required to. take it but
would be informed that his refusal did not alter his obligation to the United States
(War Department Mobilization Regulations Nos. 1-7, October 1, 1940, § II, par.
13 (e)) ; and the defense reasoned that since his refusal to subscribe to the oath made
no difference it meant that induction took place before the oath was administered, and
that the time of acceptance was the logical point of time on which to pin that induction.
12 United States v. Smith, 47 F. Supp. 6o7 (D. C. Mass. 1942).
13. SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1941) §§ 625.3, 626.14, 627.41, 628.7.
14. The Circuit Court of Appeals was of the opinion that induction occurred when
the oath was read to the selectee: ". . . having passed the requisite examinations,
it is the duty of the military authorities immediately to induct him (the selectee) and
he cannot avoid induction by refusing to take the oath. . . . Induction was completed
when the oath was read to petitioner and he was told that he was inducted into the
Army". 135 F. (2d) 505, 507 (1943).
15. See SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1941) §§ 633.I, 633.6.
I6. SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1941) §§ 629, 632.
17. "Upon reporting for induction, it shall be the duty of the registrant: . . . (3)
to appear at the place where his induction will be accomplished, (4) to obey the orders
of the representatives of the armed forces while at the place where his induction will
be accomplished, (5) *to submit to induction." SELECTIvE SERVICE REGULATIONS (2d
ed. 1941) § 633.21 (b) ; 9 FED. REG. 445, 447 (1944).
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the army and then depend on a writ of habeas corpus for such review.
The courts will not disturb a registrant's classification until he has
exhausted his administrative remedies, s and under Falbo v. United States
the selectee must report to the induction station for physical examination
and army acceptance as one of these remedies."9 But if induction does not
take place automatically upon acceptance by the army it would seem that
he still had the interval before his oath is administered in which to institute
judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court thought such a result desirable
because if the selectee had to enter the army before he could contest his
classification in the courts, and then lost his suit, he might be subject to
greater punishment for disobeying an army command than. if as a civilian
he simply refused to report for physical examination. In effect it would
be penalizing him for exhausting his administrative remedies, a result which
the Court was trying to avoid.20
Banks and Banking-Double Liability-Liability of Holding
Company Shareholders on Bank Shares Held by Corporation-Banco
Kentucky Company was organized to own controlling interests in banks. It
acquired shares in a national bank by exchanging its own shares for them
and also sold large amounts of its stock for cash. When the bank failed the
holding company was able to respond only partly to the assessment for
double liability levied against it as the principal holder of the bank's stock.
The receiver sued Banco's stockholders to recover from each his share of the
balance of the assessment. The district court dismissed the bill and the
circuit court affirmed that judgment. Held (four justices dissenting),' that
the judgment was reversed and all the stockholders, including those who
purchased their shares for cash, were liable for the assessment. Anderson
v. Abbott, 64 Sup. Ct. 531 (March 6, 1944).
The tenor of the instant decision is the refusal to permit the inter-
position of a corporate insulator as a means of depriving depositors of their
statutory protection.2  Many devices have been constructed to aid bank
stockholders in their attempts to evade liability but generally they have
failed.3  Courts, in nullifying attempts to circumvent the responsibility
iS. Johnson v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
i. Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 64 Sup. Ct 346, 88 L. Ed. 248 (I944).
20. Such a result would be most serious in the case of a conscientious objector.
It would be forcing him to submit to the thing to which he objected before giving him
an opportunity for a judicial review of his classification. Note (1943) 91 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 75'. 759.
i The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Jackson and concurred in by Justices Rob-
erts, Reed and Frankfurter, expressed the opinion that the Banco stockholders who
were such by virtue of the exchange of their bank stock might be held liable on the
theory that the formal transfer of the stock out of their own names would not be a
valid defense, but that those who purchased for cash are not liable on any established
legal principle.
2. 38 STAT. 273 (I913), 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 63, 64 (1936). For a discussion of bank
stock holding company cases as related to disregarding the corporate entity, cf. Mc-
Clanahan, Bank Stock Liability and the Holding Company Device (1941) 19 CHI.-
KENT L. RPv. 16o. The decision of the lower court in the instant case is criticized in
this article in footnote 55, at pp. 171-172
3. "All through the history of bank-stock cases the courts have been zealous in
not allowing any device to succeed in shielding the true owner from liability on his
shares." McClanahan, Bank Stock Liability and the Holding Company Device (I94I)
ig CHI.-KENT L. REv. i6o, U7r. Note, Ambit of Double Liability of National Bank
Stockholders (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rav. 1133, and cases cited therein.
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which attaches to bank shares, seem to be motivated by a very strong policy
which regards double liability as an important protection for creditors.
4 It
appears that, at least with respect to imposing liability on the cash pur-
chasers, no decision has gone quite so far. Shareholders of bank holding
companies have been liable for the statutory assessment where the holding
company was obviously formed for the purpose of avoiding double liabil-
ity; 5 where the only assets of the holding company were shares in the
insolvent bank; 6 and where the holding company's articles of incorporation
and share certificates expressly provided for the assumption of liability by -
the individual stockholders.7  It is to be noted, however, that Banco was
held not to have been formed to evade the statute; 8 that it had power to
invest in securities other than bank stock and, to some extent, exercised
it; o and that the individual shareholders did not expressly assume this lia-
bility.10 The rule that shareholders will be liable even where the holding
company was not organized with the intent to avoid double liability appears
to be expressed in some decisions 11 but is generally dictum. 2 A corpora-
tion may be looked upon as an entity for some purposes and not for others 3
and if statutory double liability is the important protective device that
4. " - . Congress intended to give all persons dealing with the bank the guar-
anty or assurance of this shareholder's liability. . . . The capital paid in on the
shares might be lost or wasted by fraud or bad management, but this additional share-
holder's liability . . . remains as a fund to be resorted to for the payment of debts
when the other means of payment are exhausted." Irons v. Manufacturers National
Bank 21 Fed. i97, 199 (N. D. Ill. 1884).
Double liability "attaches and exists for the purpose of creating a fund for the
exclusive purpose of paying the creditors of the bank equably and ratably." Page v.
Jones, 7 F. (2d) 541, 544 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
"Despite provisions in the Banking Act of 1933 for deposit insurance-and for the
removal of the double liability on national bank stock subsequently issued, and despite
the frequent legislative authorization of preferred stock not entailing individual lia-
bility, the statutory liability on bank stock is still regarded as some safeguard to de-
positors." Legis. (i935) 48 HARv. L. Rav. 659, 669
5. Corker v. Soper, 53 F. (2d) i9o (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
6. Nettles v. Rhett, 94 F. (2d) 42 (C C. A. 4th, 1938).
7. Barbour v. Thomas, 7 F. Supp. 271 (E. D. Mich. I933) ; Simons v. Groesbeck,
268 Mich. 495, 256 N. W. 496 (1934).
8 "The District Court found, and the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, that
Banco was organized in good faith and was not a sham; that it was not organized for
a fraudulent purpose or to conceal enterprises conducted for the benefit of the Bank;
that it was not a mere holding company; that it was not formed as a means of avoid-
ing double liability on the stock of the Bank; and that the soundness of the Bank and
its ability to meet the obligations could not be questioned until after the formation of
Banco. . . . We accept those findings. . . ." Instant decision at 535.
9. Banco's charter conferred broad powers so that all types of operations in the
financial and investment fields were permitted. In addition to bank shares, it held a
$2,ooo,ooo note, shares of a life insurance company and some other, more dubious, in-
vestments. At the time of the bank failure it was negotiating for the purchase of the
shares of an investment banking house.
IO. Banco's stock certificates stated that the shares were "full-paid and non-
assessable." Its certificate of incorporation provided that the stockholders' property
should "not be subject to the payment of corporate debts to any extent whatever."
ii. "Whenever the principal business of a corporation is to hold stock of this stat-
utory liability class and is without capital or other substantial assets to respond to the
statutory liability, the corporation should be disregarded and its stockholders held indi-
vidually liable. . . " Barbour v. Thomas, 7 F. Supp. 271, 278 (E. D. Mich. 1933),
aff'd, 86 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; Fors v. Farrell, 271.Mich 358, 26o N. W.
886 (1935). But cf. Burrows v. Emery, 285 Mich. 86, 28o N. W. 120 (1938).
12. In the Barbour case, for example, the holding company stockholders had ex-
pressly assumed liability.
13. Note (924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 158; ANDERSON, LIMITATIONS OF COR-
PORATE ENTITY (1931); LA-rY, SuBsIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CoRPoRA INs (936) ;
POWELL, PARENT AND SU1SIDIARY CoRPORATON s (1931); WoRMsER, THE DISREGARD
OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PRo13LEMS (1927).
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courts seem to think it isY4 there can be no quarrel with the Court's
decision. It seems a sound conclusion that a corporate shield should not
be permitted to protect against liability those who ultimately benefit from
the ownership of stock to which that liability is attached by statute. 15 The
case serves as a good example of the willingness of some courts to recog-
nize that a corporation is in fact an association of persons, rather than an
entity, and to do this especially when the particular circumstances before
them indicate that the attainment of a desirable result will thereby be
facilitated.
Conflict of Laws-Contracts-Defense of Impossibility of Per-
formance under Foreign Decrees-In April, 1938, an Austrian corpora-
tion terminated the employment contract of its Vienna office manager, a
Rumanian Jew, as of December 31, 1938, but excused him from further
service after May I, 1938. It also set forth amounts of dismissal pay and
pension due him under the contract, one-half payable immediately, and the
balance to fall due on January 2, 1939. The employee shortly after took
up residence in England. In November, 1938, Goering decrees, prohibiting
employment of Jews as managers after January I, 1939, and destroying
all pension rights under employment contracts, were promulgated. The
employee on an action begun on a writ of foreign attachment sought to
recover the balance-due him. The employer pleaded the German decrees
as a defense. Held, such decrees did not affect the employee's cause of
action to recover the remaining dismissal pay and pension regardless of
whether the action was based on liquidated debt in an account stated, or
on the employment contract. David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien
Gesellschaft, 348 Pa. 335, 35 A. (2d) 346 (1944).
The instant case adds to the confusion existing among the cases with
respect to the effect to be given to decrees of foreign governments oper-
ating on private civil rights.' The conventional conflict of laws rule of
reference in cases involving contracts with foreign operative facts is to
the law of the place of contracting and of performance.2 Under the General
Civil Code of Austria,3 in the absence of specific provisions, the place of
contracting is presumed to be the place of performance; thus, in the case
of a debt, where no mention is made to the contrary, payment is to be made
at the residence of the debtor. In the case of employment contracts, the
14. Note 3 supra.
15. The argument may be advanced that the cash purchasers of the holding com-
pany stock had not acquired substantial ownership of the bank stock since they lack
the power to sell or vote and that they therefore should not be saddled with the disad-
vantages of bank stock. However, the cash purchasers have neither less power to sell
nor less control than the holders who exchanged bank stock for their shares. Also
significant is the fact that the more important benefit for most purposes, namely, eco-
nomic profits from banking activity, are achieved by both classes of shareholders and
responsibility for double liability is not therefore an unreasonable burden to place upon
them.
I. This point is dealt with in an excellent Note, Extraterritorial Effect of Foreign
Decrees and Seizures (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 983.
2. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) §§311, comment d, 359; 3 BEALF,
CONFLrCT OF LAWS (935) §§ 355.1, 359.1, 360.1, 36o.2, 370.1 ; Goomicn, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (2d ed. 1938) §§ 307, III.
3. A. B. G. B., 9o5, i42o (I9O6). See also 3 KRASNOPOLSKI, 0STERICHISCHaES
OBLIGATIONENRECHT (914) 57, 58.
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place of performance and of payment under the business practice is pre-
sumably at the employer's place of business. In addition, it has been held 4
that an account stated cannot be the basis for a legal claim without proof
that it concerns a validly enforceable contract. Under the orthodox con-
flicts rule,5 if the performance of a contract is illegal by the law of the place
of performance at the time of performance, there is no obligation to per-
form so long as the illegality continues. In the instant case, payment of
dismissal pay and pension claims to Jews was forbidden when the time for
payment of the balance due the employee had arrived. Therefore, under
the Goering decrees which were effective in Austria, the employer had a
valid defense for non-performance. The court, however, refused to give
effect to the foreign law. It applied the law of the forum in determining
that the transaction amounted to an account stated, thereby making it
unnecesary to show the nature of the original transaction or indebtedness,
and that the pension had become a vested right in the employee, which
later legislation could not affect. Further, it held that "the cause of action,
whether on the account stated or upon the contract with VMAG, is a case
of debt" 6 and therefore payable at the residence of the creditor,7 in which
case the law of England. rather than that of Austria would apply. The
instant case, in fact, involved neither American citizens, property or con-
tracts made or to be performed in the Uinited States. The sole contact
of the forum was the presence of the garnishee. Under such circumstances,
the leading writers in the field 8 and the decided cases have usually held
that the foreign law should be applied; that no matter how objectionable
it was, it was not subject to review by our courts; 9 and that our Constitu-
tional- guarantees and provisions have no extraterritorial effect.' 0 But
4. Supreme Court of Vienna, No. 8952 GL. UNF. (1883).
5. RFSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 36o (I); 3 B-Az, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1935) §§ 360.1, 36o.2: ". . If the suit had been brought at the place of per-
formance it is admitted that no recovery could have been had; in other words, the acts
or failure to act at the place of performance gave rise to no cause of action. .
Since the cause of action must be created if at all at the place where performance was
due, there would seem to be no justification for finding a right of action in these
cases .....
6. Instant case at 347.
7. The situs of intangibles is a moot question. See Garnishment of a Debt in the
Process of Foreign Attachment (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 6o5, 6o8: ". .. A debt, an
intangible property, is not subject to allocation to any particular place or person, it
exists as a mere relationship between debtor and creditor and can have no existence
apart from both."
8. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies (1938) 25 VA. L. Rav 26. "There
is a strong public policy for the enforcement of rights of plaintiffs and the performance
of duties by defendants in accordance with the rules of law which have been worked
out to govern: To give either party an advantage because the particular judge who
hears the case does not like the particular rule of law to which reference is made gives
one party an advantage to which he is not entitled . . ."; Fraenkel, The Juristic
Status of Foreign States, Their Property and Their Acts (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 544,
569.
9. Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U. S. 253, 47 Sup. Ct. 625, 71 L. Ed. 1034, 1035
(I927) : "Here . . . the debt was due and payable in the foreign country. The only
primary obligation was that created by the law of Austria-Hungary and if by reason
of an attachment of property or otherwise the courts of the United States also gave a
remedy, the only thing that they could do with justice was to enforce the obligation as
it stood, not to substitute something else that seemed to them about fair :
Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517, 519, 47 Sup. Ct. 166, 71
L. Ed. 383 (1926) ; Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.
Y. 372, 376, 138 N. E. 24, 26 (1923) ; Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
266 N. Y. 71, 87, 88, 193 N. E. 897, 902 (1934).
io. United States v. Belmont, 3oi U. S. 324, 332, 57 Sup. Ct. 758, 81 L. Ed. 1134,
1140 (1937).
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where, however, the courts could find rights of American nationals to be
protected, or could construe a contract as performable in this country, they
readily applied their own law and expressions of public policies in prefer-
ence to the repugnant foreign law." The instant case 2 can hardly be
said to fall in the latter group of cases. It is submitted, however, that the
court's position is a justifiable one. It is no injustice to require the
employer, although precluded by the foreign law, to pay for benefits he
had received and accepted. 13 Also, the advisability of adhering strictly to
conflict of laws rules in the international field under modern conditions is
open to question. These precedents for the most part were formulated in
earlier days when the wholesale discriminatory and confiscatory effect of
decrees such as those promulgated by Soviet Russia and the Third German
Reich was scarcely contemplated.' 4 In the interstate field, the Constitu-
tional guarantees of due process and full faith and credit are stronger argu-
ments for holding to the accepted conflict of laws rules than is the case in
the international field lest too often "liberalism result in sheer profit to the
illiberal, and in scorn to the generous .... " 1
Eminent Domain-Compensation-Damages to Lessee for Re-
moval Costs as Element of the Value of Condemned Leasehold Inter-
est-The defendant held a five year lease on a warehouse. By con-
demnation proceedings I the federal government acquired one year's use
of the property. The expense of moving and preparing the space for the
government was sustained by the defendant lessee. Held (one judge dis-
ii. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. i58, 145 N. E. 917 (1924) (con-
tract made in New York) ; Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y.
248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925) (assets of Russian corporation located within our own terri-
tory) ; Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y. and Trust Co., 28o N. Y. 286, 2o N. E.
(2d) 758 (939), and Vladikavkazsky R. R. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369,
i89 N. E. 456 (934) (moneys deposited in defendant banks in New York for the ac-
counts of the plaintiffs, Russian corporations).
12. The instant case involved a debt arising in Austria between an Austrian cor-
poration and a Rumanian citizen, now resident in England.
13. Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 498, i55 N. E. 749, 755
(1927) : ". . . for the compulsory satisfaction of honest debts by debtors amply able
to pay cannot be regarded as catastrophic in any sense."; Kieran v. Hunter College
Ret. Board, 255 App. Div. 378, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 612, 614 (1938) : "A retirement pen-
sion is in the nature of pay withheld to induce continued faithful service. It amounts
to compensation for services previously rendered."
14. A goodly number of these precedents arose as a result of the activities of the
Confederacy during the Civil War and of the various expropriation measures of suc-
cessive Mexican governments but were generally limited to giving effect in the forum
to acts of a foreign government operating upon tangible property within the state. Wil-
liams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 7x6 (1877); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 3o9, 62 L. Ed. 726 (i918); Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
3 K. B. 532 (1921).
i5. Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1027, 1049. Although Professor Nussbaum declares, however,
at io43, ". . . There is only one kind of public policy which an American court must
heed, namely, American public policy, which may require the court to safeguard the in-
terests of American residents . . ."; he finds, at IO5i, that "Obviously, the objectives
of declared American public policy will be better served if enforcement of debts owned
to refugees is granted by American courts through realization of the American assets
of the refugee's debtors.
i. The condemnation was authorized by the Second War Powers Act of i942, 56
STAT. 177 (1942), 5o U. S. C. A. App. § 632 (Supp. 1943).
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senting), defendant was entitled to prove as an element of "just compen-
sation" the expense incurred in vacating the property condemned. General
Motors Corporation v. United States, 14o F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 7th,
1944).
The generally accepted rule is that compensation should be limited to
the fair market value of the property taken,2 which in this instance would
be the fair market rental value of the floor space condemned. The denial of
compensation for moving expenses has been based on various theories,
most of them, however, being merely attempted justifications of the result
of the general rule.8 One such theory is that the government is taking
only the place of business and not the business itself, and that the expenses
incurred in removing the business are therefore merely consequential, and
not an element of the value of the property taken.
4 In many cases it is
seemingly assumed that the valuation basis for the condemnation of a
leasehold should be the same as in the condemnation of a fee.
5 The instant
Court conceded that moving costs were not a proper element of the value
of a fee or, of course, of an unoccupied leasehold. 6 But it felt that the same
valuation test could not be applied to a leasehold in active use, since there
is a manifest difference in the nature of the property of which the con-
demnee is deprived. 7  However, the moving costs were not considered a
substantive item of damages, but rather as merely evidence bearing on the
value of the leasehold. 8 The theory advanced was that in case of a lease-
2. U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1942) ; In re
Post Office Site in Borough of Bronx, 2io Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); U. S. v.
Ihlots, 26 Fed. Cas. 49o, 496-497, No. I5,44Ia (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1873) ; ORGEL, VAL-
UATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1936) §§67, 68, n. 3; 18 Am. JurT,
EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 242, 255. Of course, the state decisions are only persuasive upon
the federal courts.
3. ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 68, discusses some of these theories: (I) con-
demnation of the land merely changes the date of the lessee's removal and entails no
damages which he would not incur in any event; (2) removal costs might vary greatly
in every case so as to result in unequal awards of compensation to owners who other-
wise stand on an equal footing; (3) removal costs are arbitrary and speculative; (4)
the owner might move to a distant point, prompted by whim or caprice.
4. Instant case at 879. Cf. McCoRMmIK, DAMAGES (1935) § 132, who says at page
542: "Unless the language of the statute limits the compensation to market value . . .
it seems open to the courts to summon into use the doctrine that, whin market value is
inadequate to afford fair reimbursement, . . . the damages may he measured by the
value of the property, not on the market, but the owner himself. [This] ... might well
take account of the losses that the occupant will sustain if he is forced to part with his
business location."
5. Only in a few cases have the courts cleared the way for the allowance of re-
moval costs by a frank rejection of "market value" as the standard of compensation
for condemned leaseholds. Metropolitan West Side Elevated R. R. v. Siegel, i6i Ill.
638, 44 N. E. 276 (1896) ; McMillan Printing Co. v. Pittsburg, C. & W. R. R., 216
Pa. 504, 5i, 65 Atl. 1091, 1094 (I9O7), "But market value is an unsatisfactory test of
the value to a tenant of a leasehold interest. It is really no test at all, because a lease
rarely has any market value."
6. Instant case at 875 and cases cited. The dissent argues (at 879, see cases there
cited) quite logically that if it is conceded that the government need not pay moving
expenses if it takes the fee, why need it pay when it takes less than the fee. The an-
swer to this may be that the majority realized the apparent binding authority as re-
spects leasesolds and that they therefore were free to formulate a more equitable rule
in the latter instance only. Thus the conflict is between logic and justice.
7. Instant case at 874. See note 16 infra.
8. Instant case at 874. In West Side R. R. v. Siegel, 166 III. 638, 44 N. E. 276
(1896), the Court held that moving costs were something in addition to market value
and were recoverable as a separate item of compensation. But in McMillan Printing
Co. v. Pittsburg, C. & W. R. R., 216 Pa. 5o4, 65 Atl. lO91 (1907), the owner's neces-
sity of relocating was regarded as enhancing the value of the property to him, and thus
indirectly allowed on the theory that value to the owner rather than market value was
the appropriate measure of damages.
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hold it is the defendant's right to use the property that is condemned, and
not merely a part of a leasehold term." When the leased premises are
occupied the defendant is considered as having "something more," and the
right to use is merged in the actual and physical possession of the property.
The Court concluded that a deprivation of occupancy necessarily included
as an element of its value the expense of removal. Thus the compensation
was measured by the condemnee's loss rather than the taker's gain."' The
Court felt that this was the only method whereby the condemnee could be
put in as good a pecuniary position as he would have been if the property
had not been taken, a standard approved in several decisions.11 Admit-
tedly, there was no previous federal authority for the Court's present
position but reliance was placed upon a Supreme Court dictum 12 which
conceded the possibility of situations outside the scope of the general rule.
There seems to be no doubt that the instant situation demands more
adequate relief than has been previously afforded.1 3  But another Circuit
Court,14 on identical facts, held otherwise. The answer to the conflict
should be determined either by the Supreme Court or Congressional legis-
lation, 15 for if lower courts are allowed to formulate their own concepts of
proper valuation the ultimate confusion will result in endless litigation.
Likewise, there seems to be no justification in treating the problem differ-
ently as respects leaseholds and fees.16 In both instances it is the right to
use that is destroyed, and it is fair that the government compensates for
9. Instant case at 874.
io. U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53, 76, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 677, 57 L. Ed.
io63, 1O81 (1912); U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336
(1942). But see U. S. ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 281, 63 Sup. Ct.
1O47, IO57, 87 L. Ed. 1390, 1401 (1942), "It is a well settled rule that while it is the
owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of compensation for the prop-
erty taken. . . . not all losses suffered by the owner are compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. In the absence of a statutory mandate . . . the sovereign must pay
only for what it takes, not for the opportunities which the owner may lose." Cf. note
ii infra; ORGEL, op. Cit. supra note 2, at H 71, 73.
iI. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 326, 13 Sup. Ct 622, 626,
37 L. Ed. 463, 468 (1892) ; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. U. S., 261 U. S. 299, 43 sup. Ct.
354, 67 L. Ed. 664 (1923) ; U. S. v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 43 Sup.
Ct 565, 67 L. Ed. 1014 (1923).
12. U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 373-374, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 280, 87 L. Ed. 336, 342
(1942), "It is conceivable that an owner's indemnity should be measured in various
ways depending upofi the circumstances of each case and that no general formula should
be used for the purpose."
13. Note 5 supra. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, I97
Iowa io82, 198 N. W. 486 (1924).
14. Gershon Bros. Co. v. U. S., 284 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).
15. See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 43 Sup. Ct. 684, 67
L. Ed. 1167 (1923) ; ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at §§ 5, 69; 18 Am. Jua., Eminent
Domain, § 255; McCo~mxicK, DAMAGES (1935) § 132, p. 542, "Strong reasons of policy
and fairness support the view that recompense for these losses should be specifically
authorized by the Legislature, or should be sanctioned by the courts where the way is
open, by the use of the concept, not of 'market value,' but of 'value to the owner.' Id.
at 540.
I6. Blincoe v. Choctaw, 0. & W. R. R., 16 Okla. 286, 83 Pac. 903 (9o5); City
of Richmond v. Williams, 114 Va. 698, 77 S. E. 492 (913). Both of these cases allow
recovery for removal costs of personal property where the fee was condemned. It did
not seem that the results were determined by the form of the state constitution. The
Oklahoma constitution was identical with the Fifth Amendment, while the Virginia
constitution forebade the taking or damage of property without just compensation.
There is authority that the distinction between damage and taking must be obeyed in
applying the Fifth Amendment. ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 3, n. 13; cf. n. 14.
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that which it destroys as well as that which it takes, for it is certainly not
"just" '1 to compensate for only a lesser part on the theory that only that
is "used." In this respect the equitable result of the instant case represents
a more desirable standard for determining valuation, and should be adopted.
Evidence-Subsequent Repairs as Proof of Prior Existing Con-
ditions--P, a guest at D's hotel, alleged that while asleep he was bit-
ten by a rat which entered his room through a hole in the baseboard.
Photographs of tin-covered holes taken four months after the bite were
admitted over objection to corroborate P's evidence that there were such
holes. The court subsequently charged the jury that the photographs
were admitted only for the purpose of showing an existing physical con-
dition to aid the jury in determining whether or not there were holes in
the floor at and prior to the date of the bite. The appellate court in
sustaining the ruling held, that although the photographs might lead
to an inference that D recognized the danger and remedied it, it was
not a valid reason for barring the admission for another and proper pur-
pose. Williams v. Milner Hotels Co., 36 A. (2d) 2o (1944). It is an
accepted rule that evidence of subsequent repairs is not receivable as an
admission by the defendant of his negligence.' Some courts base this on
the ground that such evidence is irrelevant inasmuch as taking precautions
for the future is not an admission of culpability in the past. Other courts
give the public policy argument, namely, that owners would be deterred
from remedying defects if the rule were otherwise. An exception is made
where control of the premises is put in issue; 2 or where such evidence tends
to prove the cause of injury; 8 or where the defendant denies that a prac-
ticable method of prevention was availalile.4 The instant case illustrates
another exception; to show prior existing conditions. 5 The full use of it
can largely nullify the effects of the general rule that evidence of subsequent
repairs is inadmissible. By the simple tactic of exaggerating the physical
conditions leading to injury, the plaintiff can make the defendant take issue
with the allegation; and then the plaintiff's offer to show subsequent repairs
as proof of existing conditions would appear to be proper. Admitting the
allegation in order to eliminate this ground of admissibility may well be
just as unfavorable to the defendant. Although the jury is warned not to
consider such repairs as proof toward establishing negligence, such mental
r7. U. S. CoxsT. AMEND. V, ". . . nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation." The view has been expressed that "The Four-
teenth Amendment . . . forbidding deprivation of property without due process of
law, does not require compensation to be made for injury to business, nor does it for-
bid such compensation." McCoRmICK, DAMAGES (935) § 132, n. 8. "Some state Con-
stitutions require compensation for the 'damaging' of property, as well as for its 'taking,'
while others provide only for payment for property taken:' Id. at § 132, see n. I for
compilation.
I. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 194o) § 283, citing many cases. The Pennsylvania
rule was to the contrary until Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274, 51 Atl. 979
(1902).
2. 2 WIGMORE, op. cit supra note i, at i58; Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa.
274, 294, 51 AtI. 979 (1902).
3. Jensen v. Davis & Weber Co., 44 Utah io, 137 Pac. 635 (1913) ; 27 HARv. L.
REv. 682 (1914).
4. Banks v. Seattle School District No. I, i95 Wash. 321, go P. (2d) 835 (1938).
5. 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note I, at 158; cf. Lederman v. Penna. Ry., 165 Pa.
118, 30 At]. 725 (1895).
RECENT CASES
limitations are difficult for juries to keep in mind, and apply. Especially
so in the instant case, because although the defendant might have had
altruistic motives, his conduct reasonably indicates consciousness of guilt.
It is doubtful under the facts of the instant case that excluding the evidence
for reasons of public policy would encourage subsequent repairs. It is also
more reasonable to believe that the accidtent prompted the application of
the remedy rather than suggested it for the first time.
Labor Law-Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act-Applicability
of Act-Non-Profit Organizations-A charitable non-profit institution
included among its activities a residence for working girls, charging rates
estimated to cover costs. On petition by a union of hotel and restaurant
workers, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board found that the institution
was an "employer" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Act, and ordered an election to determine representatives for collec-
tive bargaining purposes. The institution appealed.1 Held, the legislature
had manifestly 2 intended that the Act 3 apply only to industrial disputes;
therefore, the provisions of the Act were inapplicable to employees of non-
profit organizations. Salvation Army Case, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A. (2d) 479(1944).
The instant decision is a lamentable extension of the result reached in
the case of Western Pennsylvania Hospital et al. v. Lichliter et al.4  The
Court had there held that charitable hospitals supported in part by state
appropriations were performing a governmental function, and therefore
their employees fell within the category of state employees excluded from
the operation of the Act. It is submitted, however, that for the instant
Court to go further and to maintain that all non-profit organizations not
engaged in industrial pursuits 5 are exempt from the operation of the Act
i. Since the decision in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Heinel Motors,
344 Pa. 238, 25 A. (2d) 306 (1942), the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board has been
denied the right to appeal in cases involving its own decisions. In the instant case,
however, the Attorney-General intervened under the provisions of the Act of May 25,
1915, P. L. 616, as amended July 7, i9ig, P. L. 731, 12 P. S. § 145, on the ground that
the appeal involved the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board over
non-profit corporations, which ws a matter of great public concern.
2. Because of the words found in § 211.2 (a) of the Findings and Policy of the
Act including "within and between industries," "sweat shops," "production and con-
sumption," etc., the instant Court (at log), was "drawn irresistibly by the language
used to the conclusion that the legislature meant to limit its provisions to industrial
pursuits."
3. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of June I, 1937, P. L. ii68, as amended by
the Act of June 9, 1939, P. L. 293, and the Act of May 27, 1943, P. L. 741, PA. STAT.
A NoT. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.1 et seq.
4. 340 Pa. 382, 17 A. (2d) 2o6 (1941), 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1103 (1941).
5. Where such non-profit organizations enter the industrial field, although devot-
ing resulting profits to charity, the instant Court at p. i1O, intimated that it did not
mean to decide or imply that they were "exempted from taxes or regulations such as
the Labor Relations Act to which any other industry or business is subjected." There
have been somewhat analogous problems with respect to these non-profit organizations
in the tax field. In YMCA of Germantown v. Phila., 323 Pa. 4O, 187 At. 204 (1936),
that portion of a building which the organization rented to lodgers was held subject to
tax. There was no showing here that profit resulted to the charity; therefore, there
would seem to be little distinction between this case and the instant case. In the
YMCA case, at 412. the Court held that the "fact that the environment is religious,
and mentally and morally uplifting, does not alter the fact that renting of its rooms is
substantially like the renting of rooms in other lodging houses." The instant Court,
however, failed to see any similarity between the two cases, and cited the YMCA case
as an example of a non-profit organization entering the industrial field.
458 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
is to give an artificial and unwarranted interpretation to the Act. The
legislature had intended primarily to protect the rights of employees to
bargain collectively.6 It had further decreed that the Act be liberally
interpreted.7 It had listed specific exceptions clearly. In its definitions of
"person,". "employer," and "employee," 8 it had made no distinctions be-
tween non-profit and profit organizations nor between first-class and
second-class corporations. In other legislation, the legislature had shown
it knew how to exclude charities.9 It is suggested, moreover, that it would
have been neither an injustice nor an inconvenience to have found such
institutions within the Act.10 Scrubwomen, carpenters, and maintenance
men perform the same labor whether employed by a charitable organization
or an automobile manufacturer, and are entitled to equal protection. Fur-
thermore, the Court, by the view it has taken in the instant case, has over-
looked the protection that inclusion within the Act would afford to the
employer. By virtue of this decision, charitable organizations can be put
under a serious handicap, as there is nothing to prevent their employees
from organizing. 1 Thus, where confronted by rival employee groups, the
employer cannot now ask the Labor Relations Board to assume jurisdic-
6. The Act states as its purpose: ". . . it is hereby declared to be the public
policy of the State to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and to protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection, free
from the interference, restraint, or igoercion of their employers.' PA. STAT. ANNOT.
(Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.2 (c).
7. PA. STAT. ANxOr. (Purdon, i94i) tit. 43, § 211.2 (d).
8. PA. STAT. ANNOT. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, §211.3, Definitions: "(b) The term
'person' includes an individual, partnership, association, corporation, legal representa-
tive, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or labor organization.
"(c) The term 'employer' includes any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the
interest of an employer, but shall not include the United States or the Commonwealth,
or any political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Federal Railway La-
bor Act, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or any-
one acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. (Italics
added.) (As amended by the Act of June 9, i939, P. L. 293, and the Act of May 27,1943, P. L. 741.)
"(d) The term 'employee' shall include any employee and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connec-
tion with, any current labor dispute, or because of any unfair labor practice, and who
has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall
not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic serv-
ice of any person in the home of such person, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse." (Italics added.)
9. Unemployment Compensation Act of December 5, 1936, P. L. 2897, PA. STAT.
ANNOT. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 751 et seq. Sub-paragraph "(7) The word 'employ-
ment' shall not include: Service performed in the employ of a corporation, community
chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual." (Italics added.)
io. Other state courts have so held. See Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc., 24 Wis. 78, 7 N. W. (2d) 590 (943) ; Northwestern
Hospital v. Public Building Service Employes' Union, 208 Minn. 389, 294 N. W. 215
(i94o) ; State Labor Relations Board v. McChesney, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 866 (94o).
Ii. Since the decision in American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321,
6i Sup. Ct. 568. 85 L. Ed. 513 (941), holding that an injunction against peaceful
picketing was a denial of the worker's freedom of speech, it would seem that the right
to picket, strike, or join a union is available even to employees of non-profit organiza-
tions.
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tion, and then be legally free to deal with the group certified by the Board
after proper elections. Claims by competing unions cannot be settled by a
certification made by the Board.1 2 The net result is scarcely a minimizing
of labor strife. Two lower court cases have since followed the instant
decision, and have held the Act inapplicable to employees of a municipally
operated college,' 3 or to one not run for profit.14  In view of these new
exceptions which have been worked into the Act by these four recent
cases,15 it might well be deemed desirable for those interested in promoting
machinery for amicable labor relations to sponsor express legislative action
to bring these non-profit organizations within the operation of the Act.
Maritime Law-Limitations on the Defense of the Doctrine of
Fellow Servant Negligence-P, a seaman ordered to stand upon a
staging in order to paint the bridge of a vessel owned by D company, was
injured when one of the ropes selected by the mate to support the staging
broke, and brought a libel for damages for injuries received. P having
recovered maintenance and cure, the sole question here is P's right to
indemnity. Held, for P. The defective staging is a breach of the implied
warranty by the owner of the vessel as to the seaworthiness of its equip-
ment, and P is to be indemnified, even though the unseaworthiness of the
appliance is attributable to negligence of a fellow servant of the injured
seaman.' Manich v. Southern S. S. Co., 64 Sup. Ct. 456, 88 L. Ed. 414
(1943)_2
Since the passage of the Federal statute commonly referred to as the
Jones Act,3 the defense of the fellow servant doctrine has not been avail-
12. Where, however, both employer and employees of such non-profit organiza-
tions voluntarily submit themselves to the Board, the Board has assumed jurisdiction;
see the Reports of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Case No. 126, Year of 1941
(involving the Drexel Institute of Technology), Case No. 58, Year of i942 (concern-
ing the YWCA of Philadelphia), etc.
13. City of Phila., Trustee, etc. v. Lichliter, et al., Pa. Ct. Com. Pis. No. 253,
April 12, 1944; 14 L. R. R. 236, April 24, 1944, which held that the Act did not apply
to employees of a college maintained with trust funds and operated by a municipality
for the education of impecunious persons, since the college was not operated for profit
and its functions had no connection with industry. This institution employed over six
hundred persons.
14. Washington & Jefferson College v. Gifford, et al., Pa. Ct. Com. Pis. No. 74,
April 12, 1944; 14 L. R. R. 237, April 24, i944, which held that the Act did not apply
to a college operating as a non-profit eleemosynary educational institution and meeting
55% of its expenses from the income of endowment funds and the balance from pay-
ments by students.
15. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, et al. v. Lichliter, et al., 340 Pa. 382, 17 A.
(2d) 2o6 (1941) ; Salvation Army Case, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A. (2d) 479 (1944) ; City of
Phila., etc. v. Lichliter, et al., 14 L. R. R. 236 (1944) ; and Washington & Jefferson
College v. Gifford, et al., 14 L. R. R. 237 (1944).
i. Justice Roberts dissented, laying emphasis upon the evils of overruling previous
decisions. The decision which he felt should not be abandoned was based upon the rea-
soning that a lack of ample seaworthy equipment and not the presence of unseaworthy
equipment rendered a vessel unseaworthy. Hence, fellow servant negligence and not
unseaworthiness was the cause of P's injury, and P could not recover unless he
brought an action under the Jones Act.
2. Lower court citations were: 45 F. Supp. 839 (E. D. Pa. 1941), aff'd, 129 F. (2d)
857 (1942), 135 F. (2d) 6o2 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943).
3. The Jones Act (June 5, 1920), 41 STAT. 988, 1007, C. 250, 46 U. S. C. A. § 688.
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able 4 if the action was not brought within three years.
5  The instant suit
was not brought until six years after the injuries were sustained and there-
fore was decided upon the unmodified rules of the maritime law. In Amer-
ican maritime law there is an implied warranty of seaworthiness in con-
tracts between the owner of a ship and a seaman employed on it for a par-
ticular voyage. The owner, among other obligations to the seaman, is
bound to provide a seaworthy ship and to maintain it in a seaworthy con-
dition.6 Failure to do so is the basis of an injured seaman's right to recover
damages for resulting injuries. But where the injuries have been occa-
sioned by the negligence of a fellow servant 
7 and not by the unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel or its appliances," the damages have been limited to the
expense of maintenance and cure. The problem of the instant case arises
when both negligence and unseaworthiness are present. The Circuit Court
found negligence upon the part of the mate 9 and held the vessel not to be
unseaworthy, 10 the latter by reason of a previous Supreme Court decision,
Plamals v. The Pinar del Rio," that held a vessel was not unseaworthy so
long as there was good rope on board from which a safe staging might have
been rigged. In the instant case, the Supreme Court avoided the question
of fellow servant negligence by holding the vessel to be unseaworthy with-
out regard to negligence, and granting indemnity upon that ground. At the
same time, it overruled the Pinar del Rio case upon which the Circuit
Court had relied. The latter case was out of line with the previously settled
rule of the maritime law, as represented by The Osceola case, which had
4. The Jones Act (June 5, 1920), 41 STAT. 988, i007, c. 250, 46 U. S. C. A. § 688,
enlarged the rule of liability under maritime law by applying to it all the statutes of
the United States which modified or extended the common law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employees. De Zon v. American President Lines,
3i7 U. S. 617, 63 Sup. Ct. 814, 87 L. Ed. 501 (1942) ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 
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U. S. no, 56 Sup. Ct. 707, 8o L. Ed. 1075, rehearing denied it 298 U. S. 692, 56 Sup.
Ct. 945,78o L. Ed. 1409. (936).
5. The original period was two years, but this was modified by Congress to three
years.
6. Rainey v. New York P. S. S. Co. (Rainey v. W. R. Grace & Co.), 216 Fed. 449,
453 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914), L. R. A. I9i6A, ii49, urit of certiorari denied in 235 U. S.
704, 35 Sup. Ct..209, 59 L. Ed. 433 (1914).
7. For such purposes, under general maritime law all members of the crew have
been held to be fellow servants, with the exception perhaps of the master. The Osce-
ola, 189 U. S. i58, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760 (903) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 5oi, 62 L. Ed. 1171 (1918) ; Kallech v. Deering,
i6i Mass. 469, 37 N. E. 450 (894).
8. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct. 475, 66 L. Ed.
927 (1921) ; The Osceola, i89 U. S. 153, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760 (19o3) ; Que-.
bec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375, io Sup. Ct. 397, 33 L. Ed. 656 (i89o).
q. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit affirmed the judgment by a di-
vided court. The dissenting judge felt the evidence sufficient to show that there was
no negligence on the part of the mate. The rope in question had been new when
stored in the Lyle gun box for use with life-saving apparatus, and had never been used
until two years later when the mate directed a length cut off for use in the staging.
The mate testified that he had inspected the rope himself shortly before the accident.
Manich v. Southern S. S. Co., 135 F. (2d) 6o2, 604 (C. C. A. 3rd, i943).
io. While the court ruled that the basis of an injured seaman's claim for indemnity
was the seaworthiness of the vessel, the court added that to prove such unseaworthi-
ness, P must do more than merely show the defectiveness of an instrumentality selected
by a fellow servant from a large quantity not shown to be defective. Manich v.
Southern S. S. Co., 45 F. Supp. 839, 840 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
ii. "The record does not support the suggestion that the 'Pinar del Rio' was un-
seaworthy. The mate selected a bad rope when good ones were available." Plamals
v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U. S. 151, 155, 48 Sup. Ct. 457, 458, 72 L. Ed. 827, 829
(927). In this case the P was being hoisted up to paint a smoke stack; a rope broke
and P fell to the deck, sustaining serious injuries. The mate had selected for the pur-
pose a rope that was rotten in appearance.
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placed the vessel owner under absolute liability to provide and maintain a
seaworthy ship and safe appliances. 12 Interpreted in the light of the instant
case, it would appear that where the vessel is unseaworthy, neither lack of
negligence on the part of the vessel owner, nor the fact that a fellow servant
contributed to the injury resulting from the unseaworthiness of the vessel,
will relieve the vessel owner of his absolute liability. Only in those cases
where a fellow servant is the sole cause of the injury will the owner be
relieved in action not brought under the Jones Act. It now seems settled
that a vessel upon which there is unseaworthy equipment of any kind is an
unseaworthy vessel for the purposes of such rule."8
Res Judicata-Patent Infringement-Manufacturer's Control of
Prior Infringement Suit Against Its Vendee Held Not Bar to Defense
of Monopoly Not Asserted in Prior Suit-A won a patent infringe-
ment suit.' B though not a party of record had actively maintained the
defense. Then A sued to enjoin B's alleged contributory infringement. B
claimed that A violated the anti-trust laws, a defense not interposed in the
earlier action. A argued that this matter was res judicatma Held (four
justices dissenting), for B. Even if the patent infringement is res judicata,
the injunction is denied because A's conduct contravenes the anti-trust
laws. Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S.
661, 64 Sup. Ct. 268, 88 L. Ed. 262 (1944) ; rev'g, 133 F. (2d) 803 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1942) ; aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 43 F. Supp. 692 (E. D. Ill.
1942).
The Restatement of Judgments recognizes that certain persons, though
not parties of record, are so closely associated with an action, that the
judgment binds them as privies.2 Since they are not parties to the litiga-
tion, the judgment is necessarily based on a different cause of action than
that which gives rise to the second suit. Therefore the principles of merger
and bar do not apply, and the privy is bound by the rules of collateral
estoppel only as to matters actually litigated.' But the federal courts seem
to have developed a different rationale as respects patent infringement suits,
12. A seaman is entitled to recover indemnity for injuries due to an unseaworthy
vessel, or for failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to
the ship. 'Even the exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obliga-
tion to the seaman to furnish adequate appliances. The Osceola, 189 U. S. I58, 175,
23 Sup. Ct. 483, 487, 47 L. Ed. 760, 764 (19o3), has been followed in at least eighteen
Supreme Court decisions and nearly two hundred times by lower federal courts. See
also, The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 1io, 56 Sup. Ct. 707, So L. Ed. io75, rehearing
denied in 298 U. S. 692, 56 Sup. Ct. 945, 8o L. Ed. 1409 (1936) ; The Edward I. Mor-
rison, 153 U. S. 199, 14 Sup. Ct. 823, 38 L. Ed. 688 (1894). The Court has gone so
far as to speak of seamen as "wards of the admiralty," in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 431, 59 Sup. Ct. 262, 266, 83 L. Ed. 265, 270 (1938). "If the
unseaworthiness of the vessel was a contributing cause of the injury to seamen, with-
out which it probably would not have happened, it does not affect the owner's liability
that negligence of members of the crew developed this unseaworthiness into action and
made it destructive when it would otherwise have been harmless." Patton-Tully
Transp. Co. v. Turner, 269 Fed. 334, 339 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921).
13. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct 475, 66 L. Ed.
927 (1921) ; The Noddleburn, 30 Fed. I42 (C. C. D. Ore. 1886); The Frank and Wil-
lie, 45 Fed. 494 (S. D. N. Y. 18gi).
i. Smith v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., io6 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
2. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 83.
3. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 84, comment b; Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment (1942) 56 HARV. L. REv. I; (1944) 57 HARv. L. REV. 574.
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perhaps because the manufacturer of the alleged infringing article almost
always actively assumes the defense when his licensee or vendee is sued by
the patentee.4 Recognizing the substantial interest of the manufacturer
and his close alliance with the defendant of record, it seems that the courts
have bound him, in effect, by the principles of merger or bar. This is
accomplished under one of two theories: the person assuming the defense
is treated as though he were a party to the action,5 or the definition of"parties" is enlarged to include such persons.6 While he cannot be com-
pelled to become a party of record, nevertheless the decree is binding on
him.7 Admission by counsel in open court,8 or an entry made in the record
of the prior suit accomplishes the same result.9 If either of the above
theories is used, the defendant would be concluded not only by matters
litigated, but also by those that could have been litigated, since he is treated
as though he were a party to the action.' But the requirements for bind-
ing one not a party to the action are strictly applied. He must have some
interest of his own to protect;:" formerly his defense had to be open and
avowed with notice to the other party,12 but there is recent authority for
binding even a secret defendant by an adverse judgment;' 13 his control of
the litigation must have been complete. 4 All of these conditions were satis-
fied in the instant case, yet the majority refused to pass an opinion on the
question of res judicata.'5 It reasoned that the doctrine could not foreclose
the defense B now tendered, for then a court of equity "would be placing
its imprimatur on a . . . violation of the anti-trust laws." 16 Of course
4. Doherty Research Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., io7 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939), at 549, "Not infrequently a situation similar to what here has arisen is
presented in the trial of a patent suit. A party not the defendant of record, assumes
the defense. At times it gives to the defendant a bond to protect it against loss." (The
manufacturer of the alleged infringing device had assumed the defense in a suit against
its licensee by the patentee.)
5. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Thermoco, Inc., 116 F. (2d) 845, 846
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Nelson Mfg. Co. v. Myers & Bros. Co., 25 F. (2d) 659, 666 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1928) ; David Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 57 Fed. 980, 985 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1893) ; 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 19o2) § 539.
6. Theller v. Hershey, 89 Fed. 575 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1898) ; David Bradley Mfg.
Co. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 5o Fed. 193 (189i), aff'd, 57 Fed. 98o (C. C. A. 7th, 1893).
7. Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. Winton Hotel, 263 Fed. 988, 994 (N. D.
Ohio, 1920).
8. Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Ralph N. Brodie Co., 5I F. Supp. 202 (N. D. Cal.
1943).
9. Bryant Electric Co. v. Marshall, 169 Fed. 426, aff'd, I85 Fed. 499 (C. C. A. 1st,
1911).
io. Warford Co. v. Bryan Screw Machine Products Co., 44 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A.
6th, 1930) ; Weisbaum v. Gerlach, 33 F. Supp. 783 (S. D. Ohio, 1940) ; Eagle Mfg.
Co. v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 5o Fed. 193 (C. C. N. D. Ill. i89i); Eagle Mfg. Co.
v. Moline Plow Co., 50 Fed. 195 (C. C. N. D. Ill. i891).
it. The manufacturer has a substantial interest in a suit against his vendee by the
patentee. Kessler v. Eldred, 2o6 U. S. 285, 27 Sup. Ct. 6i, 5i L. Ed. 1o65 (1907);
Wenborne-Karpen Co. v. Dort Motor, 3oo Fed. 404, 4o6 (E. D. Mich. 1924).
12. Souffront v. La Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U. S. 475, 30 Sup. Ct. 6o8, 54
L. Ed. 846 (1910) ; 2 BLACK, op. Cit mtpra note 5, at § 540.
13. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 12o F. (2d) 82 (C. C.
A. 3rd, 1941) ; I3 A. L. R. 1, 9 (i942).
14. General Electric Co. v. Morgan-Gardner Electric Co., i68 Fed. 52 (C. C. A.
7th, 19o8) (one assuming defence in prior litigation not bound because he did not
have exclusive control over the attorney); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil
and Refining Co., 31 F. Supp. 665 (N. D. Ill. 1939) (one assuming defence not bound
because an out of court settlement denied him the right to appeal).
15. Instant case at 669, 64 Sup. Ct. at 273, 88 L. Ed. at 268
16. Instant case at 670, 64 Sup. Ct. at 273, 88 L. Ed. at 268.
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the policy against relitigation 17 should not be allowed to defeat more im-
portant public interests, 8 but here as the dissent argues, the policy of the
anti-trust laws could be effectuated by criminal prosecution."9
Taxation-Taxability of Profits Derived by Corporation From
Sale of Its Own Stock-The petitioner company purchased its own
shares on the open market incident to a profit-sharing plan whereby the
stock was to be distributed to its employees. Four years later the plan was
abandoned and the company recapitalized through a common stock split
up.-' At this time the treasury shares were sold as part of an offering of
subscription rights to existing shareholders. The Commissioner sought to
include in gross income the amount representing the excess of the sale price
over the original cost of the treasury shares. Held, no taxable income as
the "dealings" constituted an element of a "capital readjustment", the real
nature of which was not like the sale of the shares of another corporation.
Cluett, Peabody and Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. No. 19 (January
31, 1944).
Under present Treasury Regulations 2 the taxability of treasury
shares "depends upon the real nature of the transaction, . . . to be ascer-
tained from all the facts and circumstances." The Regulations consider
the gain taxable income "when the corporation deals in its own shares as
it might in the shares of another corporation".' Although some courts
17. A forceful expression of the policy underlying the rule is set forth in Warford
Co. v. Bryan Screw Machine Products Co., 44 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), at
715, "The reason for holding a judgment binding upon those who are not formal par-
ties, though they have the right and power to control the litigation, is that they, being
the real parties in interest, have had their day in court."
IS. But the term "public interest" has been loosely held to apply in the following
cases, cited by the majority opinion: I. that a bankruptcy action be brought under Sec-
tion ii instead of Section io of the Chandler Act, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. U. S. Realty and Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455, 6o Sup. Ct. io44, 1053, 84
L. Ed. 1293, 1303 (1940) ; 2. the distribution of funds in custodia legis pending final
determination of rate regulations, Inland Steel Co. v. U. S., 3o6 U. S. 153, 157, 59
Sup. Ct. 415, 418, 83 L. Ed. 557, 56o (939) ; U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 194, 59
Sup. Ct. 795, 8oi, 83 L. Ed. 1208, 1211 (1939) ; 3. the peaceable settlement of a labor
controversy involving an interstate rail carrier, Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federa-
tion No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 552, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 6oi, 8i L. Ed. 789, 8o2 (i937) ; 4. the
rightful independence of state governments in carrying out domestic policies, Pennsyl-
vania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, i85, 58 Sup. Ct 380, 385, 79 L. Ed. 841, 847 (Y935) ;
5. the location of a railroad station in a certain place, Beasley v. Texas & P. R. Co.,
191 U. S. 492, 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 164, I66, 48 L. Ed. 274, 275 (1903).
19. Mr. Justice Roberts dissented. justices Reed, Frankfurter and Jackson con-
curred in the dissent. Instant case at 675, 64 Sup. Ct. at 275, 88 L. Ed. at 27o.
I. The dissent was inclined to accept the majority's result but felt itself bound by
previous irreconcilable Circuit Court decisions. For a historical background of the
problem, see I MERrENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1942) § 5.11.
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. III, §29.22 (a)-i5 (formerly §29.22 (a)-15 of Regulation
94 (936)). Originally the Regulations 77, Art. 66 (1932), held all treasury stock
transactions non-taxable. The precedent for the present Regulations was established
in Commissioner v. Woods Machine Co., 57 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. ist, 1932). It is
interesting to note that the broad test formulated was not necessary to the decision of
the case. Note (1938) 6 U. OF Cxi. L. Rr-v. 92, 94, n. 7.
3. Note 2 supra. Exactly what a "dealing is" is necessarily vague. It might con-
note a purchase, sale, or exchange. PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME
TAXATION (934) § 26.99. The scope of the Regulation is not limited to such active
trading in the company's stock as would be done for speculative purposes. Commis-
sioner v. Air Reduction Co., Inc., 13o F. (2d) 145, r48 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). Contra:
dissenting opinion in Allen v. National Manufacture & Stores Corp., 125 F. (2d) 239,
242 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
464 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
construe this test as "the only question presented for decision,"'4 they have
adopted different interpretations under varying factual situations. Thus,
where the resale of the shares was an incident of an employee stock-
distribution plan, the Circuit Court 5 held the test satisfied even though it
would not have been feasible to carry out "the essential purpose of the
plan" in the shares of another corporation. The profit on the resale was
considered taxable income because the company dealt, in the "controlling"
aspects of the transaction, as it might have dealt in the stock of another
company. In the instant case, contrariwise, the Tax Court found the
transaction outside the scope of the Regulation by emphasizing that neither
the acquisition nor disposition of the stock would or could have been carried
out in the stock of another organization.6 But, in holding that the profit
was a capital gain the Tax Court included in its test, as an additional con-
trolling element, the absence of a profit motive,7 a factor rendered almost
immaterial by previous decisions of the Circuit Court.8 It is possible to
distinguish the above diverse results on their facts.9 However, an irrecon-
cilable conflict arises when the two interpretations of the Regulation, which
were formulated to govern different situations, are applied to similar factual
conditions. The dilemma is illustrated by comparing the instant case with
a recent Circuit Court decision' 0 where, in both instances, the purpose of
the resale was to obtain additional capital. The Tax Court, by regarding
the "motive" as controlling, decided that no resulting economic profit would
be considered taxable income." On the other hand, the Circuit Court dis-
regarded the "motive" and considered the economic gain as income realized
by "dealings in stock". 12 If the latter decision is followed to its logical
conclusion it is difficult to determine in exactly what type of transaction
the Circuit Court will regard the sale of treasury shares as a capital adjust-
4. Instant case at 8; Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 212, 217
(1941), aff'd, 133 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); Dow v. Kavanaugh, 139 F. (2d)
42, 46 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) ; Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Miss. v. Commissioner, 1 T.
C. 8o, 84 (1942); Brockman Oil Well Cementing Co., 2 T. C. 168 (I943).
5. Helvering v. Edison Bros. Store, Inc., 133 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943);
Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943); U. S. v.
Stern Bros., 136 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
6. Instant case at 8. Cf. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Miss., I T. C. 8o, 84 (i942).
7. Note 6 supra. In Note (1937) 47 YALE L. 3. III, 121, the author argues for
the desirability of eliminating motive as an element in determining the taxable status
of treasury shares.
8. Dow v. Kavanaugh, 139 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943). Cf. Allen v. National
Manufacture & Stores Corp., 125 F. (2d) 239, 242 (C. C. A. 5th, i942). *Other Cir-
cuit Court decisions seem to consider motive important only when it strengthens the
holding that the corporation is dealing in its own shares as it might in the shares of
another corporation.
9. In the employee stock-distribution cases it is admitted that there is no intention
to effect a capital transaction. Helvering v. Edison Bros. Store, Inc., 133 F. (2d) 575
(C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
Historically a great deal of the confusion in the decisions has resulted from the
failure to distinguish the situations in which the treasury stock is used as the medium
of payment for an expense incurred, or income accrued, or as the consideration for the
sale or exchange of property. In these situations the gain or loss results from the
very nature of the transaction, not from the fact that treasury shares are involved.
Rankin, Income Tax Aspects of a Corporation's Dealings in Its Own Shares, 89 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 934, 949 (1941); Note (I937) 47 YALE L. J. 1ii, 113.
Io. Dow v. Kavanaugh, 139 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943). Cf. Allen v. Na-
tional Manufacture & Stores Corp., 125 F. (2d) 239 (C. C. A. 5th, I942), where the
intent was to effect a capital readjustment. The case is analyzed in Commissioner v.
Air Reduction Co., Inc., 13o F. (2d) 145, 148 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
1I. Instant case at 8, 9. The point is stressed that the original purchase plan was
entirely disconnected with the resale distribution. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Miss.
v. Commissioner, I T. C. 8o, 86 (1942).
12. Dow v. Kavanaugh, 139 F. (2d) 42, 46 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943).
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ment.13 The Tax Court seems to be attempting to preserve a fragment of
an almost judicially extinct theory-that a corporation can realize no profit
or loss from the sale of its own stock. 14 The Circuit Court's interpretation
represents the opposite extreme by considering the gain income whenever
the ultimate financial result could conceivably have been accomplished with
the stock of another corporation. 5 Where the "motive" is considered
material enough flexibility is maintained to allow the decision of each trans-
action on its merits. This seems to be what the Regulations suggest.'6 In
contradistinction, the Circuit Court's test is an attempt to enforce the rigid
application of an all-inclusive rule. The absence of a Supreme Court ruling
leaves the conflict unanswered.17  Even more perplexing is the question of
the effect of the recent Dobson "8 case. If the Tax Court's rulings are no
longer subject to review, then a finding below that a capital transaction
occurred would leave the appellate court with no alternative but to affirm.
13. Ibid. The court did not feel that it was required to go as far as the District
Judge did in holding "that every transaction in its own shares other than an original
issue is taxable." But no factual situations are suggested that would constitute a cap-
ital transaction. One suggested test that this court might use is that ". . . it is
reasonable to say that when a corporation buys or sells its own stock, a change in its
capital structure takes place; and that the change may be [italics supplied] of material
significance although purchases are followed by sales, if substantial amounts of stock
are involved and the stock is held in the treasury for substantial periods of time." R.
J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 302, 308 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938),
rev'd on other grounds, 306 U. S. 110, 59 Sup. Ct. 423, 83 L. Ed. 536 (1939).
14. "Before the sale of 'treasury shares' the corporation is liable to its sharehold-
ers in the sum of their claims against it, which equals the net value of its then assets,
including any increase in their value when the 'treasury shares' have been held. The
corporate shares are of course increased by the sale, but the new shares create new
liabilities which will precisely equal the increase, and there can be no profit to the cor-
poration. The only escape from this is to treat the corporation as so completely inde-
pendent of its shareholders, that its obligations to them should be disregarded in
figuring its gains and losses. But to do so would completely distort the corporate in-
come. . . . E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 69, 71 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
mod'fd in, IO2 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). See 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. i27 (1938).
15. The court's rationale has been that the answer to the problem ". . . depends
upon whether it is made to turn upon a theory or a fact. In theory a corporation can-
not own a share in itself. . . . In fact corporations do buy and sell their own cor-
porate shares, as they buy and sell other forms of property, ignoring . . . the fact
that the shares are their own. These are 'as if' transactions. The shares are bought
and sold as if they were not the corporation's own shares. . . . If the subject of
purchase and sale were, as is assumed, not the corporation's own shares, the gain . . .
would be . . . income. . . ." First Chrold Corp. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d)
2, 23 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 306 U. S. x7, 59 Sup. C. 427, 83
L. Ed. 542 (1939).
6. Note 2 supra. The Regulations require the courts to delve into all the "facts
and circumstances." It is reasonable to assume that the "motive" governing the trans-
action would be pertinent. However, it has been suggested that the Regulations do not
make motive a criterion. C. C. H. 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. 8487. See Note (1937) 47
YALE L. J. i1, 121.
17. The only Supreme Court decision construing the Regulation held its retro-
active effect invalid, but made no comment upon its prospective validity. R. J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co. v. Comm., 3o6 U. S. 110, 59 Sup. Ct. 423, 83 L. Ed. 356 (i939).
i8. Dobson v. Commissioner, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 247, 83 L. Ed. 179 (i943). "What-
ever latitude exists in resolving questions such as tose of proper accounting, treating
a series of transactions as one for tax purposes . . . exists in the Tax Court . . . ;
when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut
mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand." The question of fact to be
determined would seem to be whether or not the corporation dealt in its own shares
as it would have in the shares of another corporation.
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Torts-Privilege to Discipline Children-Effect of Excessive
Force-P, pupil, had been ordered by D, principal, to the latter's office
to be punished for impudence and refused to move and vigorously sought
by kicking and scratching to escape the grasp of D who had begun to pull
him along. D pushed P to the floor and knelt and then sat upon P's
abdomen. Because of P's efforts to free himself from D's weight, he sus-
tained a skin abrasion below the right shoulder blade, which became infected
and osteomyelitis resulted. Held, while D had a privilege to use reasonable
force to secure obedience, P was justified in attempting to escape unreason-
able force, and D was liable for the injuries which P sustained. Calway v.
Williamson, 36 A. (2d) 377 (Conn. 1944).'
It is well settled that, in the absence of statutory provisions, 2 a teacher
may use reasonable force for discipline and control. This may include cor-
poral punishment. Originally, from the point of view of the criminal law,
the power was considered analogous to that which belongs to the parent,
the parent having impliedily delegated his privilege to the teacher by send-
ing the child to school.3 But since statutes in most cases now require
attendance at school of all below a certain age, and since the former theory
does not explain the relation of teacher and pupil in civil suits where the
parent enjoys a complete immunity, the better reasoning is based upon the
necessity for maintaining discipline and decorum in the school, such a
power of correction being necessary for the effectual performance of the
teacher's duties.4 The extent of such power covers all the acts of the pupil
from the time he leaves home for school until he returns there after school,
and still further if the acts tend to affect the conduct and discipline of the
school. 5 And what is reasonable force now seems also well settled. Since
a teacher may not exceed the power of a parent to discipline, the criminal
law has always considered excessive any punishment that is maliciously
inflicted or that results in permanent injury to the pupil. The tort law has
also adopted such a limit. With regard to other disciplinary measures, the
test of reasonableness no longer appears to be based mainly upon the judg-
ment or discretion of the teacher, as the earlier cases show, 6 but reason-
ableness is treated as a question of fact to be determined by an external
standard under the circumstances of each case, after considering the nature
of the pupil's offense, the means for punishment employed by the teacher,
and the age, sex, and size of the child punished.7 Yet some jurisdictions
still hold that where the punishment is not clearly excessive, the teacher
I. Detailed report in i Conn. Supp. 379 (943).
2. While some states have legislated a complete prohibition upon corporal punish-
ment, others have given to the teacher the extent of the privilege of the parent, and
still others have limited the privilege to the infliction of justifiable physical pain or
mental suffering. 3 N. J. ComP. STATS. (Education, 39o3) p. 3049, § 2o2, N. J. S. A.
(1940) tit. 18, § ig-i; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 24, § 1382; CALIF. PENAL
CODE § 273a, respectively.
3. State v. Pendergrass, ig N. C. 365, 3 Am. Dec. 416 (837).
4. Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 (847).
5. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859) ; Burdick v. Babcock, 31
Iowa 562 (871) ; O'Rourke v. Walker, io2 Conn. I3O, 328 Atl. 25, 41 A. L. R. 3308
(1925).
6. State v. Pendergrass, ig N. C. 365, 3 Am. Dec. 416 (1837) ; State v. Boyd, 88
Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (289o) ; MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES
AND OFFICERS (189o) § 731.
7. Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 At. 273 (1886); Sheenan v. Sturges, 53
Conn. 481, 2 Atl. 841 (1885) ; People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 300 Pac. 8oi
(931) ; VOORHEES. LAW OF PUBtLIC SCHOOLS (1916) § 70; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) § I5O.
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ought to be excused for an error in opinion or judgment.8 When punish-
ment has been found excessive, the rule is that the teacher should be liable
only for the injury caused by such excessive forceY In the instant case,
the court was certainly justified in holding that there is no distinction in
the application of the test between punishment and restraint incident to
discipline.10 One power without the other would often render the privilege
ineffective. But while the excessive force was applied by D to P's abdomen,
no injuries in the region of the abdomen or the back resulted from D's
sitting upon P. Medical testimony tended to show that P's disease began
with a bruise caused by P's own acts in seeking to escape from D's exces-
sive restraint. Therefore, carrying it one step further and to the logical
conclusion on the facts of this case, it appears that one who, having a
privilege, employs excessive force, not only creates a privilege in the other
to resist such excess, but also becomes liable for all the injuries sustained
by the other in the course of the resistance.
Torts-Proximate Cause-Violation of Traffic Ordinance-De-
fendant's agent violated a traffic ordinance I by leaving defendant's truck
unattended in a public alley, with ignition unlocked and key in the switch.
The truck was stolen, and thief negligently ran over plaintiff. In over-
ruling a previous decision, 2 the court held, defendant liable on the ground
that the violation of the traffic ordinance was the "legal" or "proximate"
cause 3 of the plaintiff's injury. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. (2d) i4 App.
D. C. 1943).
8. Harris v. Galliley, 125 Pa. Sup. 5oS, 189 Atl. 779 (1937). Judge Brown in
dissenting in the instant case refers to the opinion of Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt 114, 123,
76 Am. Dec. i56, 163 (1859), which states in part: "If there is any reasonable doubt
whether the punishment was excessive, the master should have the benefit of the
doubt" Feeling that the force exerted by the defendant was not clearly excessive,
Judge Brown adds, "Today, when the all too common lack of respect for authority
and disdain for discipline among school children is a matter of both common and judi-
cial knowledge . . . public school teachers are entitled to the fullest protection
which thus rule affords." Instant case at 380.
9. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt 114, 74 Am. Dec. i56 (i859) ; Austin v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., io6 Wash. 371, i8o Pac. 134 (i919) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934)
§§ 148, iss.
io. The court cites as authorities for this, Fertich v. Michener, iii Ind. 472, I
N. E. 6o5, 14 N. E. 68, 6o Am. Rep. 7o9 (1887), and Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 4 F. &
F. 656 (1865). Neither case involves a question of any force, the former being con-
cerned with an expelled student and the latter with a rule to keep pupils after school
for periods of study as punishment.
i. TRAFFiC AND MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS FOR THE Dismcr OF CoLumBIA
§ 58: "Locks on Motor Vehicles. Every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a lock
suitable to lock the starting lever, throttle, or switch, or gear-shift lever, by which the
vehicle is set in motion, and no person shall allow any motor vehicle operated by him
to stand or remain unattended in any street or in any public place without first having
locked the lever, throttle, or switch by which said motor vehicle may be set in motion."
2. Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D. C. 320 (i916).
3. "Proximate cause" has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and con-
tinuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening, produces the injury, and with-
out which the result would not have occurred." Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed. 321 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1909), 23 L. R. A. 204 (19o9) ; Behling v. Southwest Pennsylvania Pipe
Lines, z6o Pa. 359, 28 Atl. 777, 4o A. L. R. 724 (1894); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934)
§ 431. "The actor's negligent conduct in the legal cause of harm to another if (a)
his conduct is a substantial factor in-bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule
of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence
has resulted in the harm."
468 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The mere violation of a statute or ordinance generally does not of
itself establish liability for injuries caused by that violation. In order to
impose liability, the violation must be the proximate cause of the injury to
the person or persons for whose benefit the statute was passed.4 In deter-
mining this question of proximate cause, the courts must construe the
legislative intent in order to determine whether or not the elimination of
the hazard which the violation brought about was included within the scope
of the statute.5 The instant type of statute has been construed as extend-
ing liability to car owners or drivers where injuries resulted from children
meddling with improperly parked vehicles. 6 The same result has been
reached in the absence of a statute.7 However, in both instances, the court,
in imposing liability, stressed the fact that the driver knew or had reason to
know children were in the habit of playing in the vicinity where the vehicle
was parked." Situations kindred to the instant case are comparatively rare.
On similar facts, though not involving a statute, a Louisiana court relieved
the defendant of liability on the ground that the theft of the car, and not
the defendant's original negligence in leaving the motor running, was the
proximate cause of the injury.9 Some courts regard the larceny of the
automobile and its use by the thief a superseding, intervening cause which
relieves the defendant of liability.10 In the case that the instant court over-
ruled,1 no direct reference was made to the purpose of the ordinance, but
it was intimated quite strongly that the scope of the regulation did not
HA R, ToRTs (1933) § 110. "The term 'legal cause' is used to denote the fact
the sequence of events through which the actor's tortious act or omission has brought
about (in fact caused) the harm which another has sustained is such as to make it
just to hold the actor responsible therefor." ELDREDG, MODERN TORT PRoB. ss
(1941) 2o5-2o7, points out that in dealing with the question of legal or proximate cause,
the courts are confronted with two separate problems: the first involving primarily a
question of fact and the application of physical laws to determine the answer; the sec-
ond is a question of substantive law involving the question of how far society should
go in requiring the defendant to pay for damages which his conduct has in fact been
a substantial factor in producing.
4. Gorris v. Scott, L. R. q Exch. 125 (1874) ; Buczkowski v. Canton R. R., 30
A. (2d) 257 (943) ; Walter H. Browne, Adm'r v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 9o Ill. App.
49, 6o N. E. 815, 9I Ill. 226 (899) ; De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N. Y.
350, 179 N. E. 764 (1932); Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 4i N. W. W4 (x889).
5. A material factor in determining the question of proximate cause is the court's
interpretation of the purpose of the statute. If it broadly construes the enactment as
intended to eliminate the hazard which its violation brought about, then the interven-
ing act of a third person is not sufficient to break the chain of causation and liability
is imposed upon the violator of the statute. On the other hand, if the court so re-
stricts the purposes of the statute to exclude from its purview this particular hazard,
then the intervening act is treated as a superseding cause and the defendant is relieved
of liability. For a good discussion of this problem see ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PRoa-
LEMS (1941) 17-24, 205-235. Instant case at 15; Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Exch.. 125
(874) ; Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) ioo (1941) ; Moran v.
Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (i94).
6. Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. (2d) 166 (i94i).
7. Gumbrell v. Clausen Flaganan Brewery, i99 App. Div. 778, 192 N. Y. Supp.
45 (1922); Lee v. Berland & N. Y. Bill Posting Co., i9o App. Div. 742, I8o N. Y.
Supp. 295 (1920) ; Connell v. Berland et al., 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N. Y. Supp. 20
(1928). Contra: Rapczyniski et ux. v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 392, io A.
(2d) 8io (1939); Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., 25 Pa. 409, ioo Atl. 262, L. R. A.
1917D, 864 (1917).
8. Gumbrell v. Clausen Flaganan Brewery, i99 App. Div. 778, 192 N. Y. Supp.
451 (1922); Lee v. Berland & N. Y. Bill Posting Co., Igo App. Div. 742, i8o N. Y.
Supp. 295 (1920) ; Connell v. Berland et a[., 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N. Y. Supp. 20
(1928).
9. Castay et ux. v: Katz & Besthoff, Limited, r48 So. 76 (C. A. La. 1933).
Io. Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D. C. 320 (1916) ; Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261
Mass. 424, i58 N. E. 778 (1927).
ii. Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D. C. 320 (i9i6).
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contemplate protection of the public from the hazard which its violation
created. However, other courts have construed this type of statute more
broadly, and, as an incident of the safety measure feature, have extended
protection to the public where the injuries resulted from the negligent
driving of a thief. 2  A Massachusetts court, 3 in imposing liability upon
the violator of a similar safety statute, stressed the fact that the defendant
specifically knew of many previous thefts, and it was therefore "dangerous"
to leave the automobile "unlocked and unguarded." 14 Such an interpreta-
tion seems reasonable in view of the "children" cases mentioned above.
However, the instant court went even further in its judicial interpretation
of the legislative intent and imputed a general knowledge to the defendant
"that everyone knows now that children and thieves frequently cause harm
by tampering with unlocked cars." Is Thus it eliminated, as a requirement
for liability, any specific knowledge of a dangerous situation. The court
then presented as its legal test, the proposition that "Violation of an ordi-
nance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard
which the ordinance was intended to avoid, it brings about the harm which
the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm." 16 It
is submitted that such an interpretation is in accord with a wise public
policy in that it puts the burden or risk upon those who, by their conduct,
are responsible for creating the risk.
Wills-Interpretation of "In Equal Shares Per Stirpes"-Testator
erected a trust, income to his wife for life; at her death, to children and
issue of deceased children then living. Should all children predecease her
leaving no issue (which occurred), principal at widow's death to children
of testator's brothers, Godfrey and Louis, "in equal shares per stirpes . ... "
Five children of Godfrey survived the testator. Two predeceased the
widow, both leaving issue. Ten children of Louis survived testator. Five
predeceased the widow, only three leaving issue. Held, principal to be
distributed per stirpes as between the two sets of children but in equal
shares among those of each of the respective families.' Hummel's Estate,
49 Pa. D. & C. I (1944).
The problem presented in the instant case is complicated by lack of
previous judicial interpretation of the phrase "in equal shares per stirpes."
"In equal shares" alone would ordinarily indicate a per capita distribution.
2
"Per stirpes" alone would direct the distribution on a representative basis.8
The words "per" and "stirpes" assume a plurality of ancestors or stocks
12. Instant case; Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) IOOI (1941).
See comment on this case (1942) 22 B. U. L. REv. 331.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 272.
15. Instant case at 15.
16. Id. at 15.
i. The dissent would award equally to all children of Godfrey and Louis, and
where they died before the end of the life estate, their living children would take in-
stead in their own rights. Instant case at 13.
2. Brundage's Estate, 36 Pa. Super. 21I, 213 (1908) (to be equally divided share
and share alike) ; Gamier v. Gamier, 265 Pa. 175, i8o, io8 Atl. 595, 596 (1919) (di-
vided into equal shares) ; Carey, Per Capita and Stipital Division in Illinois (1940) 35
ILL. L. REv. I, IO, 15.
3. Shoch's Estate, 271 Pa. 165, 167, 114 AtL. 505, 5o6 (1921) ; White, Per Stirpes
or Per Capita (1939) 13 U. OF CiN. L. R . 298.
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(stirpes) of descent, and the descendants of the dead ancestor take property
by (per) representation, or in place of that ancestor. Ambiguity results
from the combination of the two terms. One possible solution would be
to confine the gifts to children living or to their estates if they be dead;
to give a moiety to each family, and make the gifts equal within each
group.' This would prevent a gift to issue of deceased children, but would
allow the usual interpretation of the word "children." 5 The auditing judge
chose this method, saying that "nowhere in the will is there any gift to
issue of deceased children." 6 Another possibility would be to hold that
"per stirpes" has a dual significance as a technical term, i. e. indicating a
division by stocks and by taking representation.7 "Children" must then be
held to include all children as one group." The dissenting judge followed
this pattern saying that a more "useful signification" should be found for
"in equal shares" than that used by the auditing judge. This view is based
upon the authority of the Restatement. 9 The majority preserved only part
of the meaning of "per stirpes"; that of a division by stocks of descent, and
gave a limited scope to the phrase "in equal shares" by confining it within
each stirpe.10  The dissent preserved both meanings of "per stirpes" as
indicating a family division and a substitutionary taking by representation,
and also gave a wider application to the phrase "in equal shares" so as to
include children of deceased children.
4. "A distribution per capita means that no representation applies, that the favored
class is to be determined upon as it exists at the time prescribed by the law or the will,
and that the heirs or representatives of one previously deceased cannot take, although
such decedent would have taken in his own right, as a member of the favored class, had
he survived. In this sense of the term, it is possible that the beneficiaries may be
ascertained per stirpes, and yet the will may provide for a distribution among them per
capita." 3 PAGE, WILLS (lifetime ed. 1941) § Io7o.
5. "Under a bequest to children, grandchildren and other remote issue are ex-
cluded, unless it be the apparent intention of the testator, disclosed by his will, to pro-
vide for the children of a deceased child. But such construction can only arise, from
a clear intention or necessary implication. . . " Hallowell v. Phipps, 2 Whart. 376,
380 (1837) ; accord, Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 239, 104 Atl. 6oi, 602 (1918) ;
2 HUNTER'S PA. ORPHANS' COURT COMMONPLACE BOOK (0939) 766; 3 PAGE, op. Cit.
supra note 4, § 7024.
6. It has been said, however, that indiscriminate use of the word "children" may
include remote descendants, but this is a rare interpretation. Joyce's Estate, 273 Pa.
404, 408, 117 AtI. 90, 91 (1922). But see Williamson's Estate, 82 Pa. Super. 444, 446
(1923).
7. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 301 (a), comment f; cf. In re Didfenbacher's
Estate, 300 N. Y. S. 370, 374, I65 Misc. 86, 89 (937) (no substitutional gift).
8. But cf. Baizley's Estate, 7 Pa. D. & C. 1, 2 (1926). Where beneficiaries are
divided into two groups distinguished by reference to their parents, i. e., "gift in equal
shares to children of A and children of B," the children take per stirpes.
9. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (940) § 307 (a), comment f.
70. It will be noted that the majority hold that the two brothers are merely indi-
cators of the class to take (their children), and have no possible interest themselves.
Instant case at 7. In their conclusion, however, they divide the class into two groups.
Is this division not arbitrary?
